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On July 10, in the face of rapidly falling world coffee prices, six major Latin American coffeeproducing nations announced a long-term agreement to withhold 20% of their total export crop
from the market in an effort to force prices up. Attempts earlier in the year by some Latin American
coffee-producing countries to reduce the market supply faltered until Brazil the world's largest
coffee producer joined Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua at a three-day
emergency meeting in Bogota and worked out the price-management scheme.
With the announcement of the Bogota agreement on July 10, futures prices almost immediately
gained US$0.07 on the Coffee, Sugar and Cacao Exchange in New York, rising to US$1.38 per pound
after having plunged to a 13-month low the previous week. World producers have yet to find an
efficient mechanism to manage coffee prices, which are subject to wild fluctuations as a result of
unpredictable weather and market conditions. During the previous period of sustained low prices
in 1993, when prices dropped to US$0.60 per pound, 33 coffee- producing nations including 10
from Latin America formed the Association of Coffee Producing Countries (ACPC). The ACPC
successfully drove up world market prices in late 1993 and early 1994 through the use of an exportretention system. Under this system, member nations agree to withhold part of their exports by
a percentage that is determined on a sliding scale based on world price levels the lower the price
drops below a pre-set minimum, the greater the percentage of exports retained.
A more effective price boost came from frost and drought conditions in 1994 that devastated Brazil's
crop. With world supplies greatly reduced, prices shot up to a nine-year high of US$2.74 per pound
(see NotiSur, 07/28/94, 08/04/94, and 09/01/94). However, prices sagged again in late 1994 despite
announcements by Colombia and four Central American producers (El Salvador, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua and Honduras) that they would begin withholding 20% of their exports from the market
in January. At a January meeting in London, the ACPC had authorized retention of 20% to keep
the price above US$1.28 per pound. Expected crop shortfalls appeared to give the plan a boost. In
March, the US Agriculture Department, whose forecasts are considered authoritative, predicted that
Brazil's output for June and July would be 34% below normal. The prediction sent futures prices
sharply higher to US$1.75 per pound. A later estimate by Brazilian producers of an even greater
shortfall pushed the price briefly to US$1.85 per pound.
Nevertheless, between mid-March and mid-June, futures prices fell by 21% to US$1.46 per pound
despite a series of announcements by Colombia and the Central American producers that they
would maintain the 20% retention and possibly halt exports altogether. Some coffee futures analysts
attributed the price slump to a number of market factors including a seasonal drop in demand,
longer-term decline in US and European consumption patterns, and predictions of a record
Brazilian output in the fall. On the other hand, the failure of export-retention tactics to bolster prices
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led coffee-marketing officials in the producing countries to conclude that world prices were being
manipulated by speculators. For example, analysts in the London futures exchange noted that US
investors were selling coffee futures, depressing the price, even though there was ample evidence
that declining supplies would exert an upward pressure.
"There is a shortage of coffee in the world," said Ruben Pineda, executive director of the El Salvador
Coffee Council. "The market is not responding to supply and demand," he said, "but to technical,
speculative factors generated by the consuming countries." Herbert de Sola, a Salvadoran coffee
grower, said speculators were negotiating more coffee in futures contracts than actually existed.
"There is chaos in the futures market," he said. As a result, the president of the Costa Rican
exporters association (Camara de Exportadores de Cafe de Costa Rica), Arturo Lizano, called for a
revision of the ACPC agreement. "We suggest a reconsideration of the measures used to achieve a
point of equilibrium that will allow us to place coffee on the market," he said.
The president of Costa Rica's Coffee Institute, Alonso Lara, said the difference between the current
price collapse and the previous price crises of 1989 and 1993 is that now the producing countries
still have large inventories and consequently more ability to influence price. During meetings in
June, Colombia and the Central American producers agreed to maintain their retention at 20% of
their production or 10.5 million 132-pound bags. Guatemala dropped out of the agreement in May
but for the moment was independently retaining 20% of its output. Though Brazil remained on the
sidelines, there were indications that export retention would be effective in the tug-of-war between
producer and consumer nations. For one thing, stocks held by coffee-roasting firms in consuming
countries had dropped to 12 million bags in June, down from 22 millions bags at the same time last
year. Stocks were expected to decline further to 10 million bags in October.
Under these circumstances Colombia and the four Central American producers acted on the
assumption that buyers could not withstand any further shrinkage in supply without paying higher
prices soon on fall delivery. Jorge Cardenas, manager of the Colombia coffee growers association
(FEDCAFE) said that together, the five nations would withhold 900,000 bags until the first week of
July. Stepping up the psychological pressure on speculators, the group announced on July 3 that it
was considering a suspension of all exports. Subsequently, the price quoted on the Coffee, Sugar
and Cacao Exchange in New York for September delivery recovered slightly on July 8, rising to US
$1.30 per pound.
However, some futures analysts considered the surge less a result of export manipulations than of
rumors that Brazil was about to cooperate with the plan by limiting its exports to 800,000 132-pound
bags per month, a 20% reduction from its usual one million bags per month. But the price gain was
quickly wiped out by new declines as Brazil announced it would not join the retention effort, though
the government offered financial assistance to Brazilian exporters who voluntarily retained crops.
As a result, in early July, the price for September robusta coffee, which provides the reference price,
dropped on the London market to its lowest level in 13 months, representing a total accumulated
decline of 50% in prices since mid-1994. "It has been a frenzied sell-off with blood being spilled
every day," said a London dealer. Added Ivory Coast Commodities Minister Guy Alain Gauze, "No
fundamental element justifies this unprecedented collapse in such a short time."
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Because Brazil holds 20% of this year's estimated coffee crop, commodity brokers predicted that
retention efforts would fail unless Brazil joined Colombia and the Central American producers.
"Without Brazil, forget it," said Roland Viet of Paragon Coffee Trading in New York. Arthur
Stevenson, analyst for Prudential Securities Inc., said, "Everything coming out of Brazil lately has
been contradictory and has been turned on its head a day or two later." Indeed, contradicting
Brazil's announcement just days before that it would not join any formal retention plan, Brazilian
representatives attended an emergency meeting in Bogota on July 8-10 and agreed to a long-range
plan to lower stocks held by importers in consuming countries from 12 million bags to eight million
by the end of the coffee year in September.
To accomplish this and to keep those stocks for sustained periods at a level that would be sensitive
to the producers' export-retention mechanism, the six nations agreed to drastic cuts in their
combined exports over the next year. The plan proposes to limit worldwide yearly supply to
60 million bags once the African and other major producers agree to cooperate. According to a
statement issued after the emergency meeting, the total export from the Latin American partners in
the Bogota plan will be restricted to slightly more than 28 million bags between July 1995 and June
1996.During the July-September quarter of this year, the total for the six nations will be only 6.13
million bags distributed as follows: Brazil, 3 million bags; Colombia, 2 million; El Salvador, 470,000;
Costa Rica, 415,000; Honduras, 180,000; and Nicaragua, 60,000.
In the following three quarters the combined totals will be 7.4 million, 7.5 million, and 7.02 million
bags, respectively. On July 11, the president of the Guatemalan coffee producers association,
Mariano Ventura, announced that association members would reverse their policy and join the
plan, reducing their monthly output by 20%. The latest strategy leaves a number of questions
unanswered. Coffee-market analysts say that drying up the inventories in consuming countries
may not be enough to sustain higher prices in the long run without participation by Indonesian and
African producers and without maintaining strict discipline among ACPC member states.
The Latin American producers will put the Bogota plan on the agenda at the next ACPC meeting
scheduled for the end of July. Despite any price increase brought about by the Bogota plan, many
analysts expect prices eventually to resume a downward trend because of general overproduction.
While the price on the London futures market for September delivery jumped markedly following
the news from Bogota, futures trader Geoff Ellis said the price rise "was due to take place anyway
since the market was oversold." Celeste Georgakis, an analyst for Dean Witter, said that pricemanagement schemes in the past have not stood up for long because of the difficulty in preventing
exporting countries from cheating on their quotas and the pressure they are under to clear their
warehouses and cut storage costs.
An analyst at Merrill Lynch & Company said, "At some point, (the producers) are going to say,
'We've brought the market back up to a level where we feel comfortable,' and then it will really
come to, 'I've got coffee to sell.'" If the retention strategy does not produce satisfactory results,
some Latin American trade ministers may opt for more drastic measures. El Salvador's Ruben
Pineda said the producers in the region should consider raising the amount of coffee held from
market from 20% to 30%. (Sources: Financial Times, 05/01/95; Inter Press Service, 06/21/95 07/04/95;
Agence France-Presse, 06/08/95, 07/03/95, 07/04/95; Reuter, 05/26/95, 06/10/95, 07/09/95; La Jornada,
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07/06/96/5, 07/09/95, 07/10/95; Notimex, 07/10/95; Associated Press, 06/16/95, 07/11/95; Deutsche
Press Agentur, 07/11/95; United Press International, 07/11/95; New York Times, 06/14/95, 07/06//95
07/07/95, 07/08/95, 07/11/95)
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